Pyrrho on higher level inductions
I once thought of a bridge scenario. It went like this: There is a bridge. Someone, a man, wants to find out whether it will break down in the future. So he keeps driving his car over it. It doesn't break. So he rents a larger car which weighs more, but still the bridge does not break down. He continues this with larger and larger vehicles until the bridge finally breaks down. An interesting part is that the closer we get to the break down of the bridge, the more justified is the man's belief that it will not break. Another interesting thing is that we would not conclude like the man did in real life, for we know of bridges that have broken down in the past. That got me thinking but nothing concrete came out of it. In a discussion of Hume Pyrrho wrote:
“Basically, a "higher level" induction is simply an induction about a broader or "higher" category of items. Thus, for example, one can think about cases in which one has touched flames, or one can think about cases in which one has touched something. The second of those is a broader category, and hence is a "higher level". Normally, a higher level induction is considered to be better, as, for example, if you buy a new car, and on day 1, it does not break down, and on day 2, it does not break down, etc., such that one might be tempted to draw the conclusion that the car will never break down. However, if one applies a higher level induction regarding mechanical devices, one may then decide that there is a high likelihood of the car breaking down at some point, as mechanical devices have often been observed to do so.”
That seems to explain the scenario nicely.