Sentences as secondary truth bearers in a pluralistic proposition theory
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It seems to me that monist sentence theories are too implausible, but might it not nonetheless be the case that some sentences are true/false? In this essay I will discuss sentences as secondary truth bearers. Pragmatic value I can see that it has some pragmatic value to say that sentences are also sometimes true/false
Sentences as secondary truth bearers in a pluralistic proposition theory
Sentences as secondary truth bearers in a…
Sentences as secondary truth bearers in a pluralistic proposition theory
It seems to me that monist sentence theories are too implausible, but might it not nonetheless be the case that some sentences are true/false? In this essay I will discuss sentences as secondary truth bearers. Pragmatic value I can see that it has some pragmatic value to say that sentences are also sometimes true/false