Wiki. Source. Kennethamy: Well, here is an example: in English we use the terms, "believe" and "know" very differently, from which we can infer that there is a difference between "believing" and "knowing". For instance, we say, "Joe believes that La Paz is the capital of Ecuador, but he is wrong". We never say, "Joe knows that La Paz is the capital of Ecuador, but he is wrong". However, we have to be cautious. There are often extraneous circumstances which govern what we say so that if we attend only to what we say, will mislead us. A good example is that we do not say "It is raining, but I do not believe it is raining". But that cannot show that it cannot be true that it is raining but I not believe it is raining. (Moore's Paradox). Here is an interesting example of a sentence that may be true, but which, for extraneous factors not having to do with its semantics (meaning) it would make no sense to say.
Something about Moore's 'paradox'
Something about Moore's 'paradox'
Something about Moore's 'paradox'
Wiki. Source. Kennethamy: Well, here is an example: in English we use the terms, "believe" and "know" very differently, from which we can infer that there is a difference between "believing" and "knowing". For instance, we say, "Joe believes that La Paz is the capital of Ecuador, but he is wrong". We never say, "Joe knows that La Paz is the capital of Ecuador, but he is wrong". However, we have to be cautious. There are often extraneous circumstances which govern what we say so that if we attend only to what we say, will mislead us. A good example is that we do not say "It is raining, but I do not believe it is raining". But that cannot show that it cannot be true that it is raining but I not believe it is raining. (Moore's Paradox). Here is an interesting example of a sentence that may be true, but which, for extraneous factors not having to do with its semantics (meaning) it would make no sense to say.