When it comes to the effect of education on intelligence, mostly I feel confused, and this post doesn't fully solve my confusion. Here's my understanding:
I'll start with the basics; what is cognition and the g factor, and why is it important? As a simplified model, we might say that people face various tasks in their life; for instance maybe they need to go buy some food, or they need to solve some sort of issue at work, or whatever. Some of these tasks are cognitive tasks, in the sense that performing them is significantly dependent on intelligence; e.g. "abstraction, logic, understanding, self-awareness, learning, emotional knowledge, reasoning, planning, creativity, critical thinking, and problem-solving".
For any given cognitive task, people vary in their ability to solve it. This can happen for a lot of reasons, e.g. task familiarity or domain-specific knowledge, or more generally applicable skills and biological (especially brain) factors that are useful for the task. But there are a lot of cognitive tasks, and so that naturally raises the question of, what are the usual patterns in individual differences in task solving ability?
And the overwhelmingly important and dominant finding here is then the g factor: There is variation in a cognitive process or set of processes which is useful for just about any task you can think of. This variation appears to be mostly biological in origin. Why is this important? Because the modern world is so heavily dependent on cognitive abilities, and because the g factor is so broad, it becomes one of the biggest influences on outcomes of interest, in particular on "broad" outcomes. Whenever there is some outcome we want to study, there are likely some cognitive challenges that people need to face in order to achieve it, and those cognitive challenges will always depend fairly strongly on the g factor, so g automatically becomes important for the outcome.
I believe the above is pretty standard, and pretty compatible with your post? Now the parts that confuse me or which I think are less compatible with your post:
According to the above argument, g is primarily important because it improves your cognitive performance in a variety of real-world scenarios. But this seems like it implies that if there is any other factor, which also improves your cognitive performance in a similar variety of real-world scenarios, then it should also similarly improve your outcomes. It doesn't have to have the exact same pattern of associations as g has, or have the exact same mechanisms as g has, presumably the main thing that matters is that it improves your performance sufficiently broadly and sufficiently much.
Now suppose we take the first study you looked at in this post. It claims that education improves scores across all of the test types they tested, and that it does so in a persistent way. If it is right, then I think whether it is "on g" shouldn't matter for whether it has knock-on effects on things like economic productivity, because per the above argument even non-g factors which have broad effects should still be useful in practice. (That doesn't mean that it doesn't matter at all whether it is "on g". After all, whether the factor is "on g" can be useful for understanding other topics, such as the nature of race differences in intelligence; if education is off g but race differences are on g, then differences in education cannot be the cause of differences in intelligence.)
After analyzing this study, in the rest of your post, you argue that education doesn't improve real-world outcomes. This would be weird according to my theory, except you also argue that education doesn't improve test scores on all tests, which makes it make sense. Maybe education improves some abilities that are not useful, while there are other abilities that are useful that don't get improved by education. I'm not sure I buy the idea though, since the claims that there are such tests seem kind of sketch in some ways (e.g. reliant on multiple comparisons). But supposing we grant it, it seems like that should make it a huge priority to gather a battery of such tests, since they can presumably be more valid, and causally cleaner.
> "I think whether it is "on g" shouldn't matter for whether it has knock-on effects on things like economic productivity, because per the above argument even non-g factors which have broad effects should still be useful in practice."
Non-g factors aren't well correlated with measures of life outcome. This is very well known that nearly all the correlation between life outcome and IQ that are usually talked about are nearly entirely driven by g. If you take the least g-loaded items of an IQ tests, you get less correlation with life outcome.
Emil probably wrote this post assuming it was a known fact.
It is correct that the degree to which a cognitive indicator is associated with outcomes is very tightly correlated to its g-loading. However, the flaw in your argument is in assuming that this means non-g factors don't matter. In actuality, the model I described in my comment *also* predicts a very strong correlation between g-loadings and predictor-outcome correlations, even though my model doesn't count the IQ points you gain from education any lower than it counts the IQ points you get due to g.
To prove it, here is a simulation, which runs my model and still finds the classical pattern of education being negatively g-loaded and outcomes being positively g-loaded, despite education improving outcomes through improved cognition.
There is something I don't understand. Why do you have
edu = g * G_TO_EDU_EFFECT + np.random.normal(0, np.sqrt(1-G_TO_EDU_EFFECT**2), SAMPLE_SIZE)?
The design of the study is that some people randomly (at least the hope is it was random enough) get more year of education. You should instead have something like:
edu = np.random.normal(0, 1, SAMPLE_SIZE)
Because the added year of education aren't from "g" but from an external froce: the government.
The "g * G_TO_EDU_EFFECT" represents that smarter (higher g) people get more education. How much education you get isn't purely random, it's also dependent on how smart you are.
(I don't think this has any particular effect on the result, though; you could set G_TO_EDU_EFFECT to 0, and I think that would still yield the basic observations that even though education improves the outcome, 1) education's impact on IQ is perfectly negatively g-loaded, and 2) the outcome-ability correlations are perfectly positively g-loaded.
Possible way out: Education may improve real world outcomes that are not associated with g or intelligence, but are often associated with non-cognitive skills, for example socialization and empathy, which can impact physical health and longevity.
I think that is the opposite of a way out? Emil's post semi-successfully argues that education does not do much to improve real-world outcomes. However, I'm not sure I buy his argument that education does not improve intelligence. So the paradox is that education does improve intelligence but does not improve outcomes, whereas your proposal gives a mechanism by which education could improve outcomes without improving intelligence.
I do not know if he is referring to fluid intelligence or crystalline intelligence, where former is g-strong while the latter is education-strong (or grit-strong, in reference to Freddie DeBoer).
Physics nitpicking here: having an absolute zero doesn't imply a meaningful or well-defined multiplication operation. In fact, the example of the Kelvin scale is good for illustrating this: as it is a little-known fact that negative Kelvin degrees are not only theoretically possible but have also been obtainable in the lab for several decades now - and negative Kelvin degrees are actually hotter than any finite positive-Kelvin temperature. So clearly -10K is not -1 hotter than 10K. As it happens, temperature just isn't a concept with a natural preferred scale - e.g., there is no objective advantage of using Kelvin over Rankine.
Yep. The Flynn Effect is essentially this, scaled up to the level of entire populations.
When it comes to the effect of education on intelligence, mostly I feel confused, and this post doesn't fully solve my confusion. Here's my understanding:
I'll start with the basics; what is cognition and the g factor, and why is it important? As a simplified model, we might say that people face various tasks in their life; for instance maybe they need to go buy some food, or they need to solve some sort of issue at work, or whatever. Some of these tasks are cognitive tasks, in the sense that performing them is significantly dependent on intelligence; e.g. "abstraction, logic, understanding, self-awareness, learning, emotional knowledge, reasoning, planning, creativity, critical thinking, and problem-solving".
For any given cognitive task, people vary in their ability to solve it. This can happen for a lot of reasons, e.g. task familiarity or domain-specific knowledge, or more generally applicable skills and biological (especially brain) factors that are useful for the task. But there are a lot of cognitive tasks, and so that naturally raises the question of, what are the usual patterns in individual differences in task solving ability?
And the overwhelmingly important and dominant finding here is then the g factor: There is variation in a cognitive process or set of processes which is useful for just about any task you can think of. This variation appears to be mostly biological in origin. Why is this important? Because the modern world is so heavily dependent on cognitive abilities, and because the g factor is so broad, it becomes one of the biggest influences on outcomes of interest, in particular on "broad" outcomes. Whenever there is some outcome we want to study, there are likely some cognitive challenges that people need to face in order to achieve it, and those cognitive challenges will always depend fairly strongly on the g factor, so g automatically becomes important for the outcome.
I believe the above is pretty standard, and pretty compatible with your post? Now the parts that confuse me or which I think are less compatible with your post:
According to the above argument, g is primarily important because it improves your cognitive performance in a variety of real-world scenarios. But this seems like it implies that if there is any other factor, which also improves your cognitive performance in a similar variety of real-world scenarios, then it should also similarly improve your outcomes. It doesn't have to have the exact same pattern of associations as g has, or have the exact same mechanisms as g has, presumably the main thing that matters is that it improves your performance sufficiently broadly and sufficiently much.
Now suppose we take the first study you looked at in this post. It claims that education improves scores across all of the test types they tested, and that it does so in a persistent way. If it is right, then I think whether it is "on g" shouldn't matter for whether it has knock-on effects on things like economic productivity, because per the above argument even non-g factors which have broad effects should still be useful in practice. (That doesn't mean that it doesn't matter at all whether it is "on g". After all, whether the factor is "on g" can be useful for understanding other topics, such as the nature of race differences in intelligence; if education is off g but race differences are on g, then differences in education cannot be the cause of differences in intelligence.)
After analyzing this study, in the rest of your post, you argue that education doesn't improve real-world outcomes. This would be weird according to my theory, except you also argue that education doesn't improve test scores on all tests, which makes it make sense. Maybe education improves some abilities that are not useful, while there are other abilities that are useful that don't get improved by education. I'm not sure I buy the idea though, since the claims that there are such tests seem kind of sketch in some ways (e.g. reliant on multiple comparisons). But supposing we grant it, it seems like that should make it a huge priority to gather a battery of such tests, since they can presumably be more valid, and causally cleaner.
> "I think whether it is "on g" shouldn't matter for whether it has knock-on effects on things like economic productivity, because per the above argument even non-g factors which have broad effects should still be useful in practice."
Non-g factors aren't well correlated with measures of life outcome. This is very well known that nearly all the correlation between life outcome and IQ that are usually talked about are nearly entirely driven by g. If you take the least g-loaded items of an IQ tests, you get less correlation with life outcome.
Emil probably wrote this post assuming it was a known fact.
It is correct that the degree to which a cognitive indicator is associated with outcomes is very tightly correlated to its g-loading. However, the flaw in your argument is in assuming that this means non-g factors don't matter. In actuality, the model I described in my comment *also* predicts a very strong correlation between g-loadings and predictor-outcome correlations, even though my model doesn't count the IQ points you gain from education any lower than it counts the IQ points you get due to g.
To prove it, here is a simulation, which runs my model and still finds the classical pattern of education being negatively g-loaded and outcomes being positively g-loaded, despite education improving outcomes through improved cognition.
https://pastebin.com/aHYh6nH7
There is something I don't understand. Why do you have
edu = g * G_TO_EDU_EFFECT + np.random.normal(0, np.sqrt(1-G_TO_EDU_EFFECT**2), SAMPLE_SIZE)?
The design of the study is that some people randomly (at least the hope is it was random enough) get more year of education. You should instead have something like:
edu = np.random.normal(0, 1, SAMPLE_SIZE)
Because the added year of education aren't from "g" but from an external froce: the government.
The "g * G_TO_EDU_EFFECT" represents that smarter (higher g) people get more education. How much education you get isn't purely random, it's also dependent on how smart you are.
(I don't think this has any particular effect on the result, though; you could set G_TO_EDU_EFFECT to 0, and I think that would still yield the basic observations that even though education improves the outcome, 1) education's impact on IQ is perfectly negatively g-loaded, and 2) the outcome-ability correlations are perfectly positively g-loaded.
Possible way out: Education may improve real world outcomes that are not associated with g or intelligence, but are often associated with non-cognitive skills, for example socialization and empathy, which can impact physical health and longevity.
I think that is the opposite of a way out? Emil's post semi-successfully argues that education does not do much to improve real-world outcomes. However, I'm not sure I buy his argument that education does not improve intelligence. So the paradox is that education does improve intelligence but does not improve outcomes, whereas your proposal gives a mechanism by which education could improve outcomes without improving intelligence.
I do not know if he is referring to fluid intelligence or crystalline intelligence, where former is g-strong while the latter is education-strong (or grit-strong, in reference to Freddie DeBoer).
The first study Emil looked at found education to improve both.
Physics nitpicking here: having an absolute zero doesn't imply a meaningful or well-defined multiplication operation. In fact, the example of the Kelvin scale is good for illustrating this: as it is a little-known fact that negative Kelvin degrees are not only theoretically possible but have also been obtainable in the lab for several decades now - and negative Kelvin degrees are actually hotter than any finite positive-Kelvin temperature. So clearly -10K is not -1 hotter than 10K. As it happens, temperature just isn't a concept with a natural preferred scale - e.g., there is no objective advantage of using Kelvin over Rankine.