"What humans consider moral is a function of evolution." If that unprovable assertion is true, there is nothing more to be said, is there? Moral debate is pointless. There is no there there. Morality is a fiction with no truth of the matter. However, the assertion that "what humans consider moral is a function of evolution" is merely an assertion of EP supremacy.
Presumably, thinking that "what humans consider moral is a function of evolution" is also a function of evolution and is not believed because it's true. If we can step outside evolution in order to appraise the truth of that statement, then we can do that with regard to morality.
Moral relativism is co-extensive with moral nihilism, and only psychopaths are real life, as opposed to classroom, moral nihilists. Moral differences can be objectively relative to culture and circumstance - with no prisons, what are Inuit to do with miscreants? If slow and fast life history strategies are appropriate to differing environments, what is actually right to do might really differ. A fast life strategy in a slow life context might really be immoral.
Dead men have no moral opinions, but the living ones do not embrace "might makes right" as the content of their moral perspective. The common observation is that morality governs the in-group and the out-group gets subjected to the non-moral "might makes right." The conquering of out-groups takes place within a non-moral "might makes right" perspective. In other words, morality governs our in-group beliefs and actions but can simply fall by the wayside with regard to out-groups.
The "purpose" of evolution is to get your genes into the next generation. "Morality" is only a useful adaptation to the extent it accomplishes that objective. So, selfishness would be the optimal morality . . . EXCEPT, our environment is social, so we have to get along with our tribe to survive. Any biological sense of "morality" would thus presumably consist mainly of a drive to at least APPEAR to conform to the group's rules and norms to the extent necessary to be accepted. (While maintaining an undisclosed ability to break all the rules when it's really opportunistic or necessary).
So, I'd say any biological basis of morality is just a very broad sense of reciprocity and agreeableness, plus a general sense of social conformity. Anything more specific is probably not biological but rather an application of impulses to the specific cultural environment that they play out in.
But then again, you can never really prove any of these "just so" evolution theories.
Morality is what it is, and is not an "adaptation." Just as truth and beauty are not "adaptations." Because of that, we can usefully and productively debate what morality does and does not urge us to do. The adaptation train of thought is moral nihilism (useful and moral are not the same thing) and I do believe that you are not a moral nihilist.
The selfishness would be optimal - appear moral but be a bastard - line of thought was explored many years ago by Plato in The Republic and refuted. Once we are on the topic of morality, philosophy becomes the proper mode of inquiry. Science is limited to observation of behavior and outcomes, whereas intention is crucial to morality. As Aristotle commented, we must do the right thing, for the right reason (the bit missing from "science"), in the right way, towards the right people, at the right time.
If we are only interested in the expedient, that has nothing to do with morality.
We may be arguing semantics. I am using "morality" to mean the perceived/felt/agreed-upon values of the society (which is, I think, how Emil's survey was using the idea). You seem to be using "morality" as a Platonic-ideal of intentions and actions that exists independent of the cultural context.
I can't really argue with a non-falsifiable idea like Aristotle's formula. (Plus, an injunction to do the "right" thing for the "right" reason is arguably a bit circular). Also, while I agree pure expediency wouldn't be "moral," I think you'd have to admit that the utility of certain actions (especially to others in your group) is an underlying element of most philosopher's moral conception (see e.g., Kant's categorical imperative).
Kant absolutely hates and renounces utility. If that is your interpretation of the categorical imperative you are incorrect. Utility is associated with utilitarianism which Kant despised. Nothing is good but the good will, and the good will is one governed by the moral law. BTW, I hate Kant.
There is nothing circular about Aristotle. He is not presenting us with a moral theory. He is simply cataloging all the things that must be done correctly for an action to be good. If I give my grandma flowers because I love her, that's one thing. If I do it to get a bigger inheritance that is another with a completely different moral worth. Everyone would agree, I believe.
Moral philosophy is not "falsifiable" in the manner of science. You have to present arguments/evidence for assertions. That's it.
We are not arguing semantics. I'm simply a moral realist, like most philosophers. There is morality, and then there are your, or "society's", ideas concerning it. Moral realism and epistemic fallibilism are my recommended combination. I don't know what "Platonic-ideal of intentions and actions that exists independent of the cultural context" would mean.
Evolution obviously has something to do with morality, because evolution is what created human brains, but that's an irrelevant truism. It's like saying morality is created by humans, which yeah, it is, but then what? Obviously, there are different possible moral calculations and preferences, both between individuals and cultures, and given that they all exist, they have all been allowed by evolution. We also know that morality changes, even within the same in-group, and that the size of the in-group changes, and even the barriers between in-group and out-group can get thinner, today the West is much more universalist, for example. Given all this, the most relevant question is often about how one reasons about morality in order to try to convince others of one's moral preferences, and there are ways to do this.
I'm not sure, but I think there is something you do not understand.
Religion and God are not the same. Religion is a human cultural practice which does not even depend on God. No one asks whether religion exists or what religion is; they *do* ask whether God exists or what God is. It is a mistake to conflate religion with God.
By analogy, when people write about evolution shaping "human morality," or about "morality changing" I think they are mistaking the Human Interpretation of the Thing for the Thing itself. Isn't what you really mean that *human culture* has been shaped by evolution, and *human culture* changes? But then, you are saying nothing about morality, not whether it exists or not, nor anything about its nature.
People say "morality is created by humans," but I doubt humans can create morality, any more than that they can create meaning. Oh, yes, existentialists like to say "we make our own meaning," in the same way that my wife speaks about making gluten-free chocolate chip cookies for my children. She starts with rice flour, and sugar, and egg, and chocolate chips, and places all into a heated oven on a metal sheet, and out come aromatic cookies. How would you or any human *create* morality? In the same way, by baking it in an oven?
You sound like you're familiar with "The Abolition of Man" by C. S. Lewis, and I'm a big fan of that book and have taught it multiple times in philosophy classes. No. We can't create morality.
Hanson thinks that humans or their descendents will evolve features and norms conducive to evolutionary success, that compared to moderns such descendents would be completely alien, viewing the present cultural moment as some sort of fantastical dream time. In some ways such future creatures would be similar to our past farming selves. Some of his predictions are very alien albeit reasonable e.g. valuing reproduction in itself, super low time preference etc.
The fact that moral norms are the product of evolution and that current norms are maladaptive has all sorts of interesting philosophical implications relating to evolutionary debunking arguments and moral convergence.
The thing is, there's soon going to be eugenics and reproductive technology that's going to change all that. Think embryo selection, genetic editing and artificial wombs. Not to mention AI and robotics. It's hard to speculate what exactly this is going to mean for the culture in the future, but I think you can eliminate the idea that everyone is going to be living on a farm or something, or at the very least, the people in charge are going to be in urban centers using all these technologies, including to reproduce, while at the same time there may be a mass of irrelevant religious farmers.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em , you misunderstand, Robin Hanson isn't envisioning literal farmers, rather an economy dominated by machines (in this particular case brain emulations) that have reached the point such that the marginal revenue product of a brain em is equal to the cost of sustaining that brain em. That is the population is at the Malthusian limit, he predicts that such ems and their descendants would culturally be very farmer like. The Em scenario is one of many but the general claim is that farmer like norms are more conducive to evolutionary success.
I haven't read the book, but that sounds like nonsense to me. Why Malthusian limit if machines can create postscarcity? And why would Em be like farmers? Assuming these simulations behaved like biological people, surely they would want to live in urban centers and continue the urban culture of the biological people they were created from? Also, what happened to the biological people in this scenario?
Hanson is a very alien thinker, but would recommend the book and his blog for more info, but on the Malthusian question, this is simply the product of the fact that their are diminishing returns to labor, and evolution favours more fertile groups. Also note that most farming societies historically were at the Malthusian limit such that when the black death killed a bunch of people the MRPL increased and so did living standards, its true that new technology/growth modes increase productivity, but the historical pattern is that population reaches whatever the new Malthusian limit is fairly quickly, moderns are the exception.
I think that you are wrong, in that there is a natural core morality centered around, among other things, the secular part of the 10 commandments. Thou shalt not kill . . .
There are commonalities as well as differences, and perhaps the former tends to be about more fundamental things. We also know that morality changes for groups/cultures, so there can be convergence. For example, how different is Japan and Taiwan from the West, really? The experience of whites going to visit and even live in these two countries seems to be very positive. Usually, they notice some cultural differences, but nothing major, and day to day life for the typical person seems to be quite similar.
I think if you take elements of religion (honor killing of women) and culture (ie. Bushido) out of the equation, people & communities, for the most part, revert to a natural core of morality
Well, religion and culture are what make up much or even all of morality of any society, so differences in them are going to be very important in practice.
I agree that there are commonalities, but I'm not sure I agree that people revert to a similar core. I mean, how do you explain Haiti? Unlike my examples of Japan and Taiwan, which are high IQ countries and modern economies with strong Western affinities, I think any Westerner moving to Haiti would be shocked by the violence, corruption, dysfunction and other negative things. Now, you might argue that this is all due to the country's low IQ, but then, how does this fit into the idea of common morality? Is common morality applicable only to people of similar IQs?
Your last paragraph looks to me like cultural group selection theory, in which case, yes, others have thought of this. Do you mean something different?
The science of evolutionary psychology was created by the human mind and the human mind is influenced by evolution. Is evolutionary psychology therefore "nothing but" an expression of genes, environment, and evolution? All such deterministic strains of thought are self-refuting because they apply to themselves, too. The person making such assertions is governed by those very assertions. We think the claims of EP are true because evolution has made us think they are true. Or, are we autonomous individuals capable of perceiving truths and making up our own minds?
The truth of reciprocity is that if I want you to treat me nicely, then I should do the same to you. It's only fair. If you have done me an enormous favor. Then, I owe you one. Really.
A visually structured world exists so multiple organisms separately and independently have evolved the sense organs that permit perception of this fact.
Beauty exists and nature has evolved mechanisms for taking advantage of this and using it for its own purposes (attracting bees for pollination, female birds or mating, etc. We even recognize that beautiful birds are beautiful).
Moral truths exist (one good turn deserves another) and we have evolved to recognize this fact. If someone has done you wrong, you harbor resentment and a desire for revenge. Does the other person really deserve it if they intentionally and knowingly harmed you? Yes. You can then choose whether or not to act on this fact.
The lines between in-group and out-group blur and change, but that just determines whom we treat morally and whom we do not.
If someone does not share our moral, political, or religious intuitions then we construct arguments to try to persuade them of the error of their ways, mostly to no good effect. On those topics in particular, we start with an intuition and then try to justify it, if necessary.
Awad seems to have overlooked co-ethnicity as a relevant factor in his dilemmas. Which brings us to the difference between what people say in a survey and what people do in real life (most likely stop answering the survey of course).
Should the AI prioritise people's declared ideals or their actual sordid behaviours? I bet it's harder than you think to write off your car rather than hit a bunch of pedestrians - ever tried killing yourself? I wonder how that preference varies across populations.
That preference for sparing the young didn't exactly come to the fore with the Covid lockdowns.
Strong cultural influence can stem from a combination of determination to destroy one's enemies, as seen in situations like George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein, appeal to intellectually-driven groups, akin to the liberal ambiance of New York City or Amsterdam, and sustained population growth, as observed in communities like the Orthodox Jews. Over time, evolution may shape the emergence of such a dominant culture.
"morality according to the ideal observer will also be that of the conquerors."
It is said that history is written by the victors. But I suppose it's equally axiomatic that morality is defined by the victors in the contest to define morality. (Although I would see this as overwhelmingly a cultural rather than genetic process.)
Consider, for example, the lame cliche (one of Obama's favorites) that "the moral arc of the Universe bends toward justice." But if our current definition of "justice" is the yardstick for measuring the different definition of "justice" used in the past past, then the past will always seem inconsistent (i.e., "unjust") under the new and different standard. It's like saying: "our way of thinking over time has shown a distinct tendency to converge on what we think now."
Might makes right is not a statement about if something is “right” though. Might makes right is a rejection of “rights”, it’s saying that might gives you the right. Basically, do not quote laws, we carry weapons, yadda yadda. Something can be wrong but the idea that it is wrong because it violates some magical made up thing in the North Pole called a “human right” is obviously insane
Let's take some moral comparisons of something people love and something people hate.
Bryan Caplan stated the American revolution was bad because:
1) It extended slavery
2) It accelerated the displacement of the native Americans.
My response to #1 is:
A) It's not particularly clear if that is the case
B) it doesn't matter
For A I would submit a bunch of persuasive HISTORY, but who cares.
But for B the most damaging part of slavery is that it brought black people to America. Most black people that were in America were here long before the British empire abolished slavery, so no big change. If slavery were abolished decades earlier those blacks would have been share croppers instead of slaves for a couple of decades, but it really wouldn't have mattered long term.
For #2 the displacement (genocide) of the natives was the a great moral good. Creating America meant eugenically superior white people taking over incredibly productive natural resources from genetically inferior native Americans, back when that sort of things still mattered. This action created America, the greatest civilization in history responsible for immense moral good. What's a little genocide to make that happen? Even Ayn Rand could get on board (I don't support Randism).
So if genocoding the Natives is good why are the Nazies bad?
1) Anglos created their empire in the 1700/1800s, whereas Germany tried to create its Lebensrealm in the 1900s. The industrial revolution was much further along and conquest less necessary in the 20th century. Germany should have like traded and had babies and stuff (I get that nobody could see the green revolution coming, and the aristocracy needed to justify its existence) instead of trying to conquer Ukraine.
2) The Anglos mostly conquered via disease whereas the Germans had to actually murder people. Yes, if the Anglos left the natives alone they would have repopulated, but you get the gist.
3) The Slavs are semi-white (low/mid 90s IQ) while the Native Americans are trash tier. The Nazies especially got caught up in the Romantic notion of lopsided victories (like ancient times or colonial times) rather than the reality of modern war against peer competitors (everyone dies). I can see how they talked themselves into the Slavs being more like browns then borderline whites (they painted themselves into a corner because their leadership sucked and geography is a bitch), but what a mistake. Quantity (and lend lease) has a quality all its own.
Backing up a bit to Gregory Clark, what helped us escape the logic of ancient times?
In Europe (and especially NW Europe and especially Britain) Christianity + Vikings + Geography created a perfect storm of cutting edge eugenics that selected for the prefect mix of Malthus and Christianity. This eventually gave us the necessary components to escape Malthus. There was a transition period where the world couldn't quite understand what that meant, and those who through circumstance needed/decided to operate on a ancient basis clung to it to great calamity (the Confederacy, Germany, Japan, etc).
P.S. The most damning indictment of the Nazies/Japs is that when they lost they decided to Sepukku their own people for their own indulgence.
What on Earth is a semi-white? Lol. Also, there is barely any genetic distance between Polish/West Slavs and East Germans.
Regarding the morality of the conquest of the Americas, to say that your perspective is debatable is an understatement. I guess from a utilitarian point of view, you could argue that America was such a net benefit to the world that anything goes, which is what you're doing. But then, would you agree to the demise of your own people if their replacement was higher IQ? It seems that the most intuitive moral thing here is to adopt deontology and with it the moral rule of not conquering other peoples.
That said, Americans these days are obviously not to blame for what their ancestors did, that goes without saying, and if one is going to adopt hereditary and collective guilt, then everyone is to blame for something. Also, conquest was the rule in the past, and many Europeans did try to coexist with natives in peace, these are all facts that are distorted in support of the anti-white narrative.
German IQ is 100+. Russian mid 90s. Ukrainian low 90s. When you get into the mid to low 90s you're "borderline white".
Hispanics are similar with "white Hispanics" being mid 90s and brown Hispanics being low 90s/80s.
"But then, would you agree to the demise of your own people if their replacement was higher IQ?"
I would fight it but accept it as a moral good if it happened. We all have a duty to fight for our existence, but not a right to exist.
"It seems that the most intuitive moral thing here is to adopt deontology and with it the moral rule of not conquering other peoples."
Humans had to murder to keep their children from starving via Malthusian logic. This conflict made them stronger.
The trick was a combination of conflict within limits, which is what not totally strict Christianity gave us. Hence a class of people that were hard but fair could arise instead of total brutes.
It was important that disease killed most of the natives as it made it easier to replace them. Where disease didn't do that there was no replacement (colonies in Eurasia).
Note that "might makes right (for real)" is in fact a very popular moral theory in the specific instantiation that says violating the law is inherently immoral.
This is a paradox I've thought about before... If it's moral to be genuinely altruistic, in the biological sense, i.e., to be genuinely selfless in a way that has a negative impact on fitness, say, by giving away everything to strangers and then committing suicide so your flesh can feed animals or worms... Then, since that behavior will be (as asserted) selected against, that means it will result in there being less good in the universe. You can try to do some sort of utilitarian calculus to attempt to calculate the net good, which I believe is how Singer justifies not killing himself (which, from his point of view, I think he would agree he needs to justify). And maybe the math works out, maybe it doesn't... But it still seems to be a problem: If it causes there to be less goodness in the world, how can it be good?
OTOH, few of us would want to say that whatever is selected for is inherently good.
The best attempt I know of to square this circle and to attempt to provide a rational, secular justification for the objective basis for goodness etc. is Robert Wright's Nonzero, in which he argues that goodness is the increasing scope for non-zero-sum interactions. Evolution can and often does give rise to zero-sum interactions, but non-zero sum ones seem to become more common over the course of evolutionary history, and this seems to be an inevitable consequence of the way evolution works.
It's also how I justify focusing on self and family. Be good father/wife/etc., a good member of your community, etc, all the classic, boring, conservative stuff...that all the happiness research has found is most strongly associated with life satisfaction. Do that, and you can do real concrete, observable good, by being a small part of an unfolding process that is bigger than yourself. Dedicate your life to some crusade to "make the world a better place", and if history is any guide, there's a good chance you'll actually be making it a worse place, or at best just waste your life for nothing.
Plato was full of shit! Haha. I agree that your point is new and interesting. I told someone I know something similar and he got all huffy and was like, Plato is the founder of western moral thought blah blah blah, you philistene.
I would add that your view seems related to moral foundations theory? As I understand MFT, people have a sense for what is moral, similar to taste or disgust. Most everyone can taste, and tastebuds are generally hardwired to say that things that are good for us (over evolutionary history) taste good. With MFT, the idea is that people have a taste for the moral, you know it when you see it, the visceral sense that, “that ain’t right.” MFT builds out this analogy by attempting to deconvolve moral sentiments into basic flavors. MFT’s weakness is that we don’t have a organic (as in organ) structure pinned down for a putative morality tastebud.
"What humans consider moral is a function of evolution." If that unprovable assertion is true, there is nothing more to be said, is there? Moral debate is pointless. There is no there there. Morality is a fiction with no truth of the matter. However, the assertion that "what humans consider moral is a function of evolution" is merely an assertion of EP supremacy.
Presumably, thinking that "what humans consider moral is a function of evolution" is also a function of evolution and is not believed because it's true. If we can step outside evolution in order to appraise the truth of that statement, then we can do that with regard to morality.
Moral relativism is co-extensive with moral nihilism, and only psychopaths are real life, as opposed to classroom, moral nihilists. Moral differences can be objectively relative to culture and circumstance - with no prisons, what are Inuit to do with miscreants? If slow and fast life history strategies are appropriate to differing environments, what is actually right to do might really differ. A fast life strategy in a slow life context might really be immoral.
Dead men have no moral opinions, but the living ones do not embrace "might makes right" as the content of their moral perspective. The common observation is that morality governs the in-group and the out-group gets subjected to the non-moral "might makes right." The conquering of out-groups takes place within a non-moral "might makes right" perspective. In other words, morality governs our in-group beliefs and actions but can simply fall by the wayside with regard to out-groups.
The "purpose" of evolution is to get your genes into the next generation. "Morality" is only a useful adaptation to the extent it accomplishes that objective. So, selfishness would be the optimal morality . . . EXCEPT, our environment is social, so we have to get along with our tribe to survive. Any biological sense of "morality" would thus presumably consist mainly of a drive to at least APPEAR to conform to the group's rules and norms to the extent necessary to be accepted. (While maintaining an undisclosed ability to break all the rules when it's really opportunistic or necessary).
So, I'd say any biological basis of morality is just a very broad sense of reciprocity and agreeableness, plus a general sense of social conformity. Anything more specific is probably not biological but rather an application of impulses to the specific cultural environment that they play out in.
But then again, you can never really prove any of these "just so" evolution theories.
Morality is what it is, and is not an "adaptation." Just as truth and beauty are not "adaptations." Because of that, we can usefully and productively debate what morality does and does not urge us to do. The adaptation train of thought is moral nihilism (useful and moral are not the same thing) and I do believe that you are not a moral nihilist.
The selfishness would be optimal - appear moral but be a bastard - line of thought was explored many years ago by Plato in The Republic and refuted. Once we are on the topic of morality, philosophy becomes the proper mode of inquiry. Science is limited to observation of behavior and outcomes, whereas intention is crucial to morality. As Aristotle commented, we must do the right thing, for the right reason (the bit missing from "science"), in the right way, towards the right people, at the right time.
If we are only interested in the expedient, that has nothing to do with morality.
We may be arguing semantics. I am using "morality" to mean the perceived/felt/agreed-upon values of the society (which is, I think, how Emil's survey was using the idea). You seem to be using "morality" as a Platonic-ideal of intentions and actions that exists independent of the cultural context.
I can't really argue with a non-falsifiable idea like Aristotle's formula. (Plus, an injunction to do the "right" thing for the "right" reason is arguably a bit circular). Also, while I agree pure expediency wouldn't be "moral," I think you'd have to admit that the utility of certain actions (especially to others in your group) is an underlying element of most philosopher's moral conception (see e.g., Kant's categorical imperative).
Kant absolutely hates and renounces utility. If that is your interpretation of the categorical imperative you are incorrect. Utility is associated with utilitarianism which Kant despised. Nothing is good but the good will, and the good will is one governed by the moral law. BTW, I hate Kant.
There is nothing circular about Aristotle. He is not presenting us with a moral theory. He is simply cataloging all the things that must be done correctly for an action to be good. If I give my grandma flowers because I love her, that's one thing. If I do it to get a bigger inheritance that is another with a completely different moral worth. Everyone would agree, I believe.
Moral philosophy is not "falsifiable" in the manner of science. You have to present arguments/evidence for assertions. That's it.
We are not arguing semantics. I'm simply a moral realist, like most philosophers. There is morality, and then there are your, or "society's", ideas concerning it. Moral realism and epistemic fallibilism are my recommended combination. I don't know what "Platonic-ideal of intentions and actions that exists independent of the cultural context" would mean.
Your ideas interest me; I would read more of what you have to say.
Evolution obviously has something to do with morality, because evolution is what created human brains, but that's an irrelevant truism. It's like saying morality is created by humans, which yeah, it is, but then what? Obviously, there are different possible moral calculations and preferences, both between individuals and cultures, and given that they all exist, they have all been allowed by evolution. We also know that morality changes, even within the same in-group, and that the size of the in-group changes, and even the barriers between in-group and out-group can get thinner, today the West is much more universalist, for example. Given all this, the most relevant question is often about how one reasons about morality in order to try to convince others of one's moral preferences, and there are ways to do this.
I'm not sure, but I think there is something you do not understand.
Religion and God are not the same. Religion is a human cultural practice which does not even depend on God. No one asks whether religion exists or what religion is; they *do* ask whether God exists or what God is. It is a mistake to conflate religion with God.
By analogy, when people write about evolution shaping "human morality," or about "morality changing" I think they are mistaking the Human Interpretation of the Thing for the Thing itself. Isn't what you really mean that *human culture* has been shaped by evolution, and *human culture* changes? But then, you are saying nothing about morality, not whether it exists or not, nor anything about its nature.
People say "morality is created by humans," but I doubt humans can create morality, any more than that they can create meaning. Oh, yes, existentialists like to say "we make our own meaning," in the same way that my wife speaks about making gluten-free chocolate chip cookies for my children. She starts with rice flour, and sugar, and egg, and chocolate chips, and places all into a heated oven on a metal sheet, and out come aromatic cookies. How would you or any human *create* morality? In the same way, by baking it in an oven?
You sound like you're familiar with "The Abolition of Man" by C. S. Lewis, and I'm a big fan of that book and have taught it multiple times in philosophy classes. No. We can't create morality.
Hanson thinks that humans or their descendents will evolve features and norms conducive to evolutionary success, that compared to moderns such descendents would be completely alien, viewing the present cultural moment as some sort of fantastical dream time. In some ways such future creatures would be similar to our past farming selves. Some of his predictions are very alien albeit reasonable e.g. valuing reproduction in itself, super low time preference etc.
The fact that moral norms are the product of evolution and that current norms are maladaptive has all sorts of interesting philosophical implications relating to evolutionary debunking arguments and moral convergence.
The thing is, there's soon going to be eugenics and reproductive technology that's going to change all that. Think embryo selection, genetic editing and artificial wombs. Not to mention AI and robotics. It's hard to speculate what exactly this is going to mean for the culture in the future, but I think you can eliminate the idea that everyone is going to be living on a farm or something, or at the very least, the people in charge are going to be in urban centers using all these technologies, including to reproduce, while at the same time there may be a mass of irrelevant religious farmers.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em , you misunderstand, Robin Hanson isn't envisioning literal farmers, rather an economy dominated by machines (in this particular case brain emulations) that have reached the point such that the marginal revenue product of a brain em is equal to the cost of sustaining that brain em. That is the population is at the Malthusian limit, he predicts that such ems and their descendants would culturally be very farmer like. The Em scenario is one of many but the general claim is that farmer like norms are more conducive to evolutionary success.
I haven't read the book, but that sounds like nonsense to me. Why Malthusian limit if machines can create postscarcity? And why would Em be like farmers? Assuming these simulations behaved like biological people, surely they would want to live in urban centers and continue the urban culture of the biological people they were created from? Also, what happened to the biological people in this scenario?
Hanson is a very alien thinker, but would recommend the book and his blog for more info, but on the Malthusian question, this is simply the product of the fact that their are diminishing returns to labor, and evolution favours more fertile groups. Also note that most farming societies historically were at the Malthusian limit such that when the black death killed a bunch of people the MRPL increased and so did living standards, its true that new technology/growth modes increase productivity, but the historical pattern is that population reaches whatever the new Malthusian limit is fairly quickly, moderns are the exception.
I think that you are wrong, in that there is a natural core morality centered around, among other things, the secular part of the 10 commandments. Thou shalt not kill . . .
There are commonalities as well as differences, and perhaps the former tends to be about more fundamental things. We also know that morality changes for groups/cultures, so there can be convergence. For example, how different is Japan and Taiwan from the West, really? The experience of whites going to visit and even live in these two countries seems to be very positive. Usually, they notice some cultural differences, but nothing major, and day to day life for the typical person seems to be quite similar.
I think if you take elements of religion (honor killing of women) and culture (ie. Bushido) out of the equation, people & communities, for the most part, revert to a natural core of morality
Well, religion and culture are what make up much or even all of morality of any society, so differences in them are going to be very important in practice.
I agree that there are commonalities, but I'm not sure I agree that people revert to a similar core. I mean, how do you explain Haiti? Unlike my examples of Japan and Taiwan, which are high IQ countries and modern economies with strong Western affinities, I think any Westerner moving to Haiti would be shocked by the violence, corruption, dysfunction and other negative things. Now, you might argue that this is all due to the country's low IQ, but then, how does this fit into the idea of common morality? Is common morality applicable only to people of similar IQs?
By the way, great graphics.
Your last paragraph looks to me like cultural group selection theory, in which case, yes, others have thought of this. Do you mean something different?
Always knew I was supposed to lead calvary charges to seize neighboring lands and women. Thanks for letting me know my instinct is morally superior!
Morality is defined by elite human capital. 💯
The science of evolutionary psychology was created by the human mind and the human mind is influenced by evolution. Is evolutionary psychology therefore "nothing but" an expression of genes, environment, and evolution? All such deterministic strains of thought are self-refuting because they apply to themselves, too. The person making such assertions is governed by those very assertions. We think the claims of EP are true because evolution has made us think they are true. Or, are we autonomous individuals capable of perceiving truths and making up our own minds?
The truth of reciprocity is that if I want you to treat me nicely, then I should do the same to you. It's only fair. If you have done me an enormous favor. Then, I owe you one. Really.
A visually structured world exists so multiple organisms separately and independently have evolved the sense organs that permit perception of this fact.
Beauty exists and nature has evolved mechanisms for taking advantage of this and using it for its own purposes (attracting bees for pollination, female birds or mating, etc. We even recognize that beautiful birds are beautiful).
Moral truths exist (one good turn deserves another) and we have evolved to recognize this fact. If someone has done you wrong, you harbor resentment and a desire for revenge. Does the other person really deserve it if they intentionally and knowingly harmed you? Yes. You can then choose whether or not to act on this fact.
The lines between in-group and out-group blur and change, but that just determines whom we treat morally and whom we do not.
If someone does not share our moral, political, or religious intuitions then we construct arguments to try to persuade them of the error of their ways, mostly to no good effect. On those topics in particular, we start with an intuition and then try to justify it, if necessary.
Thank you for writing this. I am skeptical that you really know what you are saying, but it is interesting to me.
Awad seems to have overlooked co-ethnicity as a relevant factor in his dilemmas. Which brings us to the difference between what people say in a survey and what people do in real life (most likely stop answering the survey of course).
Should the AI prioritise people's declared ideals or their actual sordid behaviours? I bet it's harder than you think to write off your car rather than hit a bunch of pedestrians - ever tried killing yourself? I wonder how that preference varies across populations.
That preference for sparing the young didn't exactly come to the fore with the Covid lockdowns.
(OT - Is Unpaywall what we should be using?)
Strong cultural influence can stem from a combination of determination to destroy one's enemies, as seen in situations like George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein, appeal to intellectually-driven groups, akin to the liberal ambiance of New York City or Amsterdam, and sustained population growth, as observed in communities like the Orthodox Jews. Over time, evolution may shape the emergence of such a dominant culture.
"morality according to the ideal observer will also be that of the conquerors."
It is said that history is written by the victors. But I suppose it's equally axiomatic that morality is defined by the victors in the contest to define morality. (Although I would see this as overwhelmingly a cultural rather than genetic process.)
Consider, for example, the lame cliche (one of Obama's favorites) that "the moral arc of the Universe bends toward justice." But if our current definition of "justice" is the yardstick for measuring the different definition of "justice" used in the past past, then the past will always seem inconsistent (i.e., "unjust") under the new and different standard. It's like saying: "our way of thinking over time has shown a distinct tendency to converge on what we think now."
Might makes right is not a statement about if something is “right” though. Might makes right is a rejection of “rights”, it’s saying that might gives you the right. Basically, do not quote laws, we carry weapons, yadda yadda. Something can be wrong but the idea that it is wrong because it violates some magical made up thing in the North Pole called a “human right” is obviously insane
Hmmm. I guess that's up to you to decide. I am an associate editor at Voegelinview and editor at The Orthosphere, have been published at The Sydney Traditionalist Forum, The University Bookman, The Brussels Journal, The James G. Martin Center for Academic Renewal, and elsewhere. I've taught philosophy for over twenty years, but am also a lowly adjunct. The link provides a list of a selection of what I have published. The most relevant to this topic is https://voegelinview.com/darwin-vs-morality-trying-to-find-a-biological-basis-for-morality-part-i/ https://ww1.oswego.edu/philosophy/profile/richard-cocks
Let's take some moral comparisons of something people love and something people hate.
Bryan Caplan stated the American revolution was bad because:
1) It extended slavery
2) It accelerated the displacement of the native Americans.
My response to #1 is:
A) It's not particularly clear if that is the case
B) it doesn't matter
For A I would submit a bunch of persuasive HISTORY, but who cares.
But for B the most damaging part of slavery is that it brought black people to America. Most black people that were in America were here long before the British empire abolished slavery, so no big change. If slavery were abolished decades earlier those blacks would have been share croppers instead of slaves for a couple of decades, but it really wouldn't have mattered long term.
For #2 the displacement (genocide) of the natives was the a great moral good. Creating America meant eugenically superior white people taking over incredibly productive natural resources from genetically inferior native Americans, back when that sort of things still mattered. This action created America, the greatest civilization in history responsible for immense moral good. What's a little genocide to make that happen? Even Ayn Rand could get on board (I don't support Randism).
So if genocoding the Natives is good why are the Nazies bad?
1) Anglos created their empire in the 1700/1800s, whereas Germany tried to create its Lebensrealm in the 1900s. The industrial revolution was much further along and conquest less necessary in the 20th century. Germany should have like traded and had babies and stuff (I get that nobody could see the green revolution coming, and the aristocracy needed to justify its existence) instead of trying to conquer Ukraine.
2) The Anglos mostly conquered via disease whereas the Germans had to actually murder people. Yes, if the Anglos left the natives alone they would have repopulated, but you get the gist.
3) The Slavs are semi-white (low/mid 90s IQ) while the Native Americans are trash tier. The Nazies especially got caught up in the Romantic notion of lopsided victories (like ancient times or colonial times) rather than the reality of modern war against peer competitors (everyone dies). I can see how they talked themselves into the Slavs being more like browns then borderline whites (they painted themselves into a corner because their leadership sucked and geography is a bitch), but what a mistake. Quantity (and lend lease) has a quality all its own.
Backing up a bit to Gregory Clark, what helped us escape the logic of ancient times?
In Europe (and especially NW Europe and especially Britain) Christianity + Vikings + Geography created a perfect storm of cutting edge eugenics that selected for the prefect mix of Malthus and Christianity. This eventually gave us the necessary components to escape Malthus. There was a transition period where the world couldn't quite understand what that meant, and those who through circumstance needed/decided to operate on a ancient basis clung to it to great calamity (the Confederacy, Germany, Japan, etc).
P.S. The most damning indictment of the Nazies/Japs is that when they lost they decided to Sepukku their own people for their own indulgence.
What on Earth is a semi-white? Lol. Also, there is barely any genetic distance between Polish/West Slavs and East Germans.
Regarding the morality of the conquest of the Americas, to say that your perspective is debatable is an understatement. I guess from a utilitarian point of view, you could argue that America was such a net benefit to the world that anything goes, which is what you're doing. But then, would you agree to the demise of your own people if their replacement was higher IQ? It seems that the most intuitive moral thing here is to adopt deontology and with it the moral rule of not conquering other peoples.
That said, Americans these days are obviously not to blame for what their ancestors did, that goes without saying, and if one is going to adopt hereditary and collective guilt, then everyone is to blame for something. Also, conquest was the rule in the past, and many Europeans did try to coexist with natives in peace, these are all facts that are distorted in support of the anti-white narrative.
German IQ is 100+. Russian mid 90s. Ukrainian low 90s. When you get into the mid to low 90s you're "borderline white".
Hispanics are similar with "white Hispanics" being mid 90s and brown Hispanics being low 90s/80s.
"But then, would you agree to the demise of your own people if their replacement was higher IQ?"
I would fight it but accept it as a moral good if it happened. We all have a duty to fight for our existence, but not a right to exist.
"It seems that the most intuitive moral thing here is to adopt deontology and with it the moral rule of not conquering other peoples."
Humans had to murder to keep their children from starving via Malthusian logic. This conflict made them stronger.
The trick was a combination of conflict within limits, which is what not totally strict Christianity gave us. Hence a class of people that were hard but fair could arise instead of total brutes.
It was important that disease killed most of the natives as it made it easier to replace them. Where disease didn't do that there was no replacement (colonies in Eurasia).
Note that "might makes right (for real)" is in fact a very popular moral theory in the specific instantiation that says violating the law is inherently immoral.
This is a paradox I've thought about before... If it's moral to be genuinely altruistic, in the biological sense, i.e., to be genuinely selfless in a way that has a negative impact on fitness, say, by giving away everything to strangers and then committing suicide so your flesh can feed animals or worms... Then, since that behavior will be (as asserted) selected against, that means it will result in there being less good in the universe. You can try to do some sort of utilitarian calculus to attempt to calculate the net good, which I believe is how Singer justifies not killing himself (which, from his point of view, I think he would agree he needs to justify). And maybe the math works out, maybe it doesn't... But it still seems to be a problem: If it causes there to be less goodness in the world, how can it be good?
OTOH, few of us would want to say that whatever is selected for is inherently good.
The best attempt I know of to square this circle and to attempt to provide a rational, secular justification for the objective basis for goodness etc. is Robert Wright's Nonzero, in which he argues that goodness is the increasing scope for non-zero-sum interactions. Evolution can and often does give rise to zero-sum interactions, but non-zero sum ones seem to become more common over the course of evolutionary history, and this seems to be an inevitable consequence of the way evolution works.
It's also how I justify focusing on self and family. Be good father/wife/etc., a good member of your community, etc, all the classic, boring, conservative stuff...that all the happiness research has found is most strongly associated with life satisfaction. Do that, and you can do real concrete, observable good, by being a small part of an unfolding process that is bigger than yourself. Dedicate your life to some crusade to "make the world a better place", and if history is any guide, there's a good chance you'll actually be making it a worse place, or at best just waste your life for nothing.
Plato was full of shit! Haha. I agree that your point is new and interesting. I told someone I know something similar and he got all huffy and was like, Plato is the founder of western moral thought blah blah blah, you philistene.
I would add that your view seems related to moral foundations theory? As I understand MFT, people have a sense for what is moral, similar to taste or disgust. Most everyone can taste, and tastebuds are generally hardwired to say that things that are good for us (over evolutionary history) taste good. With MFT, the idea is that people have a taste for the moral, you know it when you see it, the visceral sense that, “that ain’t right.” MFT builds out this analogy by attempting to deconvolve moral sentiments into basic flavors. MFT’s weakness is that we don’t have a organic (as in organ) structure pinned down for a putative morality tastebud.